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Abstract 
We explore the meaning and implications of Bourdieu’s construct of the field of 
power and integrate it into a wider conception of the formation and functioning of 
elites at the highest level in society. Corporate leaders active within the field of power 
hold prominent roles in numerous organizations, constituting an ‘elite of elites’, 
whose networks integrate powerful participants from different fields. As ‘bridging 
actors’, they form coalitions to determine institutional settlements and societal 
resource flows. We ask how some corporate actors (minority) become hyper-agents, 
those actors who ‘make things happen’, while others (majority) remain ‘ordinary’ 
members of the elite. Three hypotheses are developed and tested using extensive data 
on the French business elite. Social class emerges as persistently important, 
challenging the myth of meritocratic inclusion. Our primary contribution to 
Bourdieusian scholarship lies in our analysis of hyper-agents, revealing the debts 
these dominants owe to elite schools and privileged classes. 
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The formation and exploitation of social networks are fundamental to leadership 
within the modern corporate economy (Burt, 1992; Kerr and Robinson, 2011; 
McDonald et al., 2008; Useem, 1984). This paper employs network analysis and 
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multivariate models to explore the determinants of access to and membership of the 
corporate ‘elite of elites’ in France, whose networks and career trajectories we track 
over a six-year period. It draws on Bourdieu’s (1993: 37-39; 1996a: 264-272) concept 
of the ‘field of power’, the integrative social domain that transcends individual fields 
and organizations, serving as a metafield of contestation for dominant agents from 
different backgrounds. We scrutinise the differentiating features of those actors whose 
networks enable them to transcend individual fields, either by bridging corporate 
networks or by engaging in extra-corporate networks. Our study is therefore 
concerned with the educational trajectories, class origins and other salient social 
features (such as gender) of main board directors of France’s leading companies, as 
well as the social characteristics of those who make up the most interrelated networks 
(corporate and non-corporate) within the field of power, thus appearing as ‘hyper-
agents’. 
 Actors with the strongest networks and most refined networking capabilities 
most often are those at the pinnacle of the largest business enterprises (Carroll and 
Sapinski, 2011; Mizruchi, 1986). The most powerful of all – hyper-agents, the elite 
within the elite – are invited to sit on the boards of other large companies and 
prestigious non-profit organizations, multiplying the number and range of their 
personal connections (Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997). These hyper-agents act as 
‘bridging actors’, seeking through the formation of coalitions to determine 
institutional settlements and control societal resource flows. We suggest that hyper-
agency represents a key means whereby an elite-dominated field of power is 
developed and sustained. While it is sometimes implied that business leaders are more 
fragmented and less influential than other elites (Hermskerk, 2007), this article adopts 
a different perspective, focusing on the networking capabilities of the French business 
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elite to identify how the most powerful attain their positions as hyper-agents 
(Coignard and Guichard, 2000). Hence, we take what might at first glance seem a 
relatively familiar research method and interpretive framework – network analysis 
and interlocking directorships – and extend and complicate these by drawing on 
Bourdieu’s (1986, 1993, 1996a) concepts of field, field of power and forms of capital. 
Adopting Bourdieu’s theoretical framework as a lens through which to explore 
corporate elites illuminates the ‘bridging actors’ that link disparate elite sectors. There 
are, of course, unique aspects to the French business system, limiting the 
generalizability of our findings. Equally, the processes determining the composition 
and functioning of the field of power in France are likely nevertheless to be similar to 
those in other Western economies, lending more general theoretical significance to 
our research (Burt et al., 2000; Useem and Karabel, 1986). 
 There is, with notable exceptions (Courpasson and Clegg, 2006; Kling et al., 
2016; Maclean et al., 2010, 2014; 2015; Reed, 2012; Zald and Lounsbury, 2010), 
relatively little research on how those emerging as hyper-agents create extensive 
social networks within and beyond the corporate sphere. Even less has been written 
about the ways in which business elites compete and co-operate with elites from other 
domains within the field of power (Mills, 1956; Savage and Williams, 2008; Useem, 
1984). This is regrettable given the disproportionate exercise of power by the few, and 
the social struggles that inform stratification. In particular, the role played by social 
class in networking and elite reproduction has been neglected (Dezalay, 1995; Scott, 
2002), precluding a fuller understanding of how power is acquired and applied at the 
highest level (Denord et al., 2011). 
It is this gap in the literature that the present article addresses. Our aim is to 
explain the processes of differentiation by which small numbers of elite corporate 
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actors become hyper-agents and bridging actors while a majority does not, examining 
what sets them apart. We apply network analysis and multivariate models to an 
extensive dataset profiling the lives and careers of 1159 leaders at the top of the 
French corporate hierarchy. Our study identifies direct and indirect relationships 
between critical variables, rigorously testing the three hypotheses we advance. In the 
following section, we elaborate Bourdieu’s concept of the field of power in terms of 
purpose, social networks and domination by hyper-agents. Next, we develop three 
hypotheses around which the paper is framed. Our methodology is then detailed 
followed by the presentation of our main findings, laying the foundations for further 
theorization and reflection in our discussion and conclusion. 
Networks and the Field of Power 
Bourdieu’s master theories of capital, field and habitus have opened up fresh avenues 
for research in numerous disciplines within the social sciences (Wacquant, 2002). His 
construct of the field of power, conversely, has received relatively little attention 
despite its novelty and theoretical potential (Bourdieu, 1993, 1996a, 2011; Denord et 
al., 2011; Swartz, 1997, 2008). The construct is essentially the ‘capstone’ of his 
theory of fields in which society is conceived as divided into a series of domains and 
sub-domains, each defined by prevailing field-specific rules of competition, practices 
and actor dispositions (Swartz, 1997). Fields are more or less stratified, with actors, 
corporate and non-corporate individuals, hierarchically differentiated by the amounts 
of capital (economic, social, cultural and symbolic) they possess (Anheier et al., 1995; 
Bourdieu, 1986a, 1990; Harvey and Maclean, 2008; Savage et al., 2005). The 
particular mix of capitals needed to progress upwards varies by field. Dominant actors 
possess the capital needed to influence the rules of the game and accumulate power. 
Subordinate actors have less capital and hence less power. To compete and advance 
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they must innovate and pursue clever strategies to undermine the power and 
legitimacy of more established actors. The odds are stacked against them, but it 
remains possible in most domains for some to progress and join the field elite 
(Bourdieu 1986, 1990). Within business, for example, this means rising to become a 
leader (owner or top executive) within a large corporation. Within politics it means 
assuming a ministerial position and within public administration it implies joining the 
upper echelons of government service (Dudouet and Joly, 2010; Genieys, 2005). 
There are counterparts in all fields, but all fields are not equal. In France, the 
corporate, political, administrative and financial elites form the core of the ruling 
elite, which nonetheless interacts routinely with members of the media, cultural, 
intellectual and scientific elites (Maclean et al., 2006; Suleiman, 1978). The field of 
power thus embraces members from a multiplicity of fields, but with some fields far 
more heavily represented than others (Wacquant, 1993). It might be thought of as an 
affiliation of dominant agents transcending individual fields. Only a minority of 
members of field elites accede to the field of power as bridging actors, effectively 
sitting above individual field elites which they transcend. The construct of the field of 
power effectively shifts the emphasis away from the hierarchical distribution of power 
to the inter-organizational, where dominant agents compete and collaborate variously 
with peers across different life-worlds (Zaheer et al., 2010). 
The field of power functions as a ‘macro-level arena of struggle’ (Swartz 
2008: 50) concerned with change or resistance to change  It both sets elite agents 
against one another, whilst providing the necessary structural conditions for them to 
collaborate through the formation of time-limited, issue-based coalitions (O’Mahony 
and Bechky, 2008). Through networks forged within the field of power, elite agents 
seek to influence societal decision-making processes, resource flows, opinion 
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formation and wider logics of action by strengthening commitment to particular 
projects or objectives or to the status quo. They ‘make accounts’, as Giddens (1984: 
29) writes, becoming the purveyors of legitimizing narratives designed to inform 
collective systems of meaning (Creed et al., 2002; Lindsay, 2008; Lounsbury and 
Glynn 2001). Fligstein (1997) explains how they exploit their social skills to direct 
authority and frame action. It is essential that their actions are legitimized by wider 
public perceptions of civic-mindedness and disinterestedness (Bourdieu 1996a: 389; 
Harvey et al., 2011), since, as Fligstein (1997: 400) argues, ‘if others think that one 
wants something and that it is narrowly for selfish purposes, then they are unlikely to 
try to negotiate’. Hence, a number of activities on the part of hyper-agents are 
disinterested, even if agents have interests in such disinterestedness (e.g. sitting on the 
boards of museums, churches etc.). 
Accession to the field of power is arduous and cannot be taken for granted. In 
France, prior research suggests that broadly defined about a third of elite directors 
enter the field of power (Maclean et al., 2014). Membership of what Mills (1956: 281) 
dubs the ‘fraternity of the successful’ depends on becoming a bridging actor 
connecting distinct networks. Here we propose that the best strategy for entering and 
maintaining position within the field of power is to seek appointment to the boards of 
both large corporations and prestigious non-profit organizations in the public, 
educational, cultural, sporting and charitable sectors (Westphal and Zajac, 1995; 
Zajac and Westphal, 1996). Board memberships, corporate and extra-corporate, are 
prized not just for the immediate rewards they confer – financial and symbolic in the 
corporate sector and symbolic in the non-profit sector – but also for the high-level 
connections they bring. Boards are meeting-places and membership creates the bonds 
of affiliation (social capital) needed to operate effectively within the field of power 
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(Stern and Westphal, 2010; Stevenson and Radin, 2009). Membership of non-profit 
boards is especially important in this aspect, affording access to actors from different 
life-worlds, which is needed to form coalitions to pursue or resist changes in opinions, 
laws and regulations (Harvey et al., 2011). Lindsay (2008: 62) calls this ‘convening 
power’, one of the most compelling resources at the disposal of elites.  
How, then, do elite corporate actors become differentiated, a minority 
becoming hyper-agents active within the field of power? The French corporate 
economy is generally portrayed as unified, characterized by dense, cohesive networks 
and the closeness of relations between the state and corporate sectors (Dudouet and 
Joly, 2010; Kadushin, 1995; Maclean et al., 2007). As Hall (2008) emphasizes, 
however, France has worked hard to meet the challenges of the new global economy. 
Since the late 1990s, the French economy has undergone considerable change, due 
largely to the growing presence of foreign, mainly US, institutional investors in the 
share capital of French firms (Hancké, 2002; Maclean, 2002). In Morin’s (2000: 37) 
view, the country has moved from being a financial network economy to being a 
financial market economy, ‘directly inspired by the American “shareholder value” 
model’, with foreign institutional investors playing a significant role in the French 
stock market. Institutional investors have been attracted both by the relative 
withdrawal of the French state, as the country receded from being a ‘statist political 
economy’, and by the concomitant introduction of governance measures associated 
with the Anglo-American model (Culpepper, 2008: 29; Goyer and Jung, 2011), to 
which senior executives often with backgrounds in finance have been ‘converted’ 
(François and Lemercier, 2016). In parallel, the cross-shareholdings which once 
formed the bedrock of French corporate capitalism have unraveled significantly. 
Financialization has not helped growing inequalities which, despite longstanding 
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values of liberty, equality and fraternity, are pronounced and intensifying (Godechot, 
2011; Piketty, 2014). 
According to Eymeri (2001: 824), agents in senior positions retain similar 
‘ways of seeing, feeling, thinking and acting’ stemming in part from the ‘strong and 
homogenous bureaucratic training’ imparted by the grandes écoles (Genieys, 2005: 
419). Subsequent admission to a grand corps – like the Inspection des Finances, the 
Corps des Mines or the Corps des Ponts et Chaussées, the pinnacle of France’s civil 
service elite, accession to which depends on the rank obtained in the final 
examinations – followed perhaps by time spent in a Ministerial Cabinet, literally 
fosters an esprit de corps (Suleiman, 1978). Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) conceive 
of the French educational system as retrogressive because access to the best 
institutions is dominated by the upper classes, ultimately strengthening disparities in 
culture, status and wealth. Turning economic capital into meritocratic performance 
legitimates access to elite positions both in the eyes of those possessing the education 
and those who might be expected to challenge inheritance (Khan, 2011). The outward 
appearance of equal opportunity is sustained by the notion of a ‘meritocratic society 
which rewards effort and … selects the best’ (Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot, 2007: 103). 
The grandes écoles foster ‘the belief of the dominant class in their own legitimacy and 
… the belief of the other classes in that legitimacy’ (Wacquant, 1993: 39). Of the 
1048 business leaders out of our sample of 1159 for whom we have HE data, 52% 
attended a top ten elite establishment, with the Ecole Polytechnique, the Institut 
d’Études Politiques de Paris (IEP), the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA) and 
HEC Paris the most popular. Hence we propose: 
Hypothesis 1: Having an elite education is a source of continuing advantage 
in establishing elite corporate connections. 
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The literature on social networks emphasizes the value of bridge-building in 
bolstering power (Coignard and Guichard, 2000; Collins-Dogrul, 2012; Geletkanycz 
and Hambrick, 1997). The external activities of directors advance careers and increase 
rewards (Useem, 1984). Burt et al. (2000: 141) found that successful French 
executives benefited from networks rich in ‘structural holes’, rewards accruing 
‘disproportionately to people who provide indirect connections between otherwise 
disconnected groups’. We know much less about the advantages of bridging between 
corporate and non-profit (charitable or voluntary) organizations (Stern and Westphal, 
2010), but reason that increasing network diversity should de facto increase an agent’s 
chance of attaining top-tier corporate positions. Hence we propose: 
Hypothesis 2: Extra-corporate networking beyond the business sphere serves 
to enhance business networks, increasing the size and strength of an agent’s 
elite corporate network. 
Palmer and Barber (2001) argue that embeddedness in prized networks is a 
manifestation of the class system, implying that corporate agents who suffer social 
status marginality have greater difficulty in penetrating the ‘inner group’ active in the 
field of power. Westphal and Zajac (1995) stress the importance of demographic 
similarity in director selection. For Stern and Westphal (2010), the agents best 
equipped to secure board appointments engage in ingratiating behaviour that enhances 
interpersonal appeal. These behaviours are more common amongst those from upper-
class backgrounds. For Bourdieu (1986: 101), life chances are objectively inscribed in 
the volume and composition of an individual’s capital. Social class is internalized as 
‘class habitus’, conditioning behaviour and influencing life chances. The material 
effect of social class on an agent’s ‘trajectory in social space’, in terms of career 
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progression and durability in the field of power, is likely far-reaching (Bourdieu, 
1987: 4). Hence we propose: 
Hypothesis 3: Social class serves a master variable underpinning an agent’s  
potential for corporate networking and hyper-agency, enhancing the 
likelihood of becoming a bridging actor. 
Our study is based upon personal and career profiles of 1159 members of the 
French corporate elite: those serving as main board members, executives and non-
executives, of one or more of France’s top 100 largest companies in January 1998. 
The top 100 French companies were identified by computing an equally-weighted 
composite measure of size based on total capital employed, turnover, profit-before-
tax, and the number of employees. Individual level data were gathered from five main 
sources: company annual reports; Le Guide des Etats Majors; Who’s Who in France; 
extensive web searches, including company websites, Business Week, Forbes and the 
Financial Times; newspaper and periodical articles.
 
We collected data on age, gender, 
place of upbringing, social origins, career, education, honours, personal interests, and 
corporate and extra-corporate networks for all members of the elite, focusing on their 
career trajectories over a six-year period between 1998 and 2004. This was an 
eventful period for France, marked by deepening European integration, the advent of 
the single currency, increasing foreign ownership of the equity of top French firms (as 
mentioned), and continuing corporate governance initiatives (driven by Marc Viénot 
and Senator Philippe Marini in particular) leading to the implementation of the 
Nouvelles Régulations Economiques and the 2003 loi de sécurité financière. 
 Bourdieu combined qualitative and quantitative analysis (through his multiple 
correspondence analysis) in his research, believing that this exploits the linkage 
between theory and research to best effect (Bourdieu, 1987; Robson and Sanders, 
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2009). While we focus here on multivariate analysis, we complement this elsewhere 
with qualitative analysis of social mobility drawing on interview data (Maclean et al., 
2012), which Bourdieu (1996b: 17) favoured as a means of capturing ‘the almost 
infinitely subtle strategies that social agents deploy in the ordinary conduct of their 
existence’. 
 
Research Process 
Following Halsey (1995), a four-way classification was adopted for social class: 
upper, upper-middle, lower-middle, and lower class. We favoured this over the three-
way class hierarchy provided in Bourdieu’s (1986: 526) Distinction (working, middle 
and upper classes), because it compelled us to specify whether middle-class actors 
were upper- or lower-middle class. The starting-point of our categorization is parental 
occupation, which we used for the purposes of classification according to the 
following schema (Bourdieu, 1987; Denord et al., 2011). Upper class (C_1) was 
reserved for those whose parents held a leading position in society or owned sizeable 
(≥1%) equity stakes in top French companies. Upper-middle class (C_2) was applied 
to top professionals including lawyers, doctors, engineers, senior state officials, and 
senior business people. Lower-middle class (C_3) was applied to white-collar 
occupations including teachers, sales people, lesser officials and technicians; while 
lower class (C_4) was reserved for parental occupations like worker, miner and van 
driver. Educational data were coded by attendance (or not) at an elite school (ES) and 
attendance (or not) at one or more elite HE institution (EHE). Bourdieu (1996a: 74-
75) defines elite schools as ‘institutions entrusted with the education and consecration 
of those who are called to enter the field of power’, such as ‘the top Paris lycées, 
Louis-le-Grand, Henri-IV, and Fénelon’; the top non-Parisian school attended by our 
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sample being the Lycée du Parc in Lyon. Top 100 company main board memberships 
were recorded for 1998 and 2004, but subsidiary board memberships were excluded. 
The type and extent of engagement in non-profit networks was recorded, covering 
charities, public bodies, industry association, HE, sports and culture. Overall network 
reach for individuals is captured by the total number of corporate and extra-corporate 
board memberships. The number of life-worlds spanned by an individual is a count of 
the types of boards they served on between 1998 and 2004. 
We seek to explain variations in the size and strength of the corporate 
networks of members of the French business elite. As a first step, our dataset was 
converted into a relational matrix making corporate ties (undirected relations) the unit 
of observation. From 1159 elite members we derived 11946 ties, a mean score of 10.3 
per member of the corporate elite. The number of ties between actors would be 
increased considerably if non-corporate board memberships (i.e. beyond the corporate 
sphere) were included. Exploring ties in external networks is more challenging due to 
lack of information (i.e. only major roles are disclosed) and the high degree of 
diversity in terms of position. Both issues cause conceptual problems as ties should be 
defined consistently, ideally formed by similar actions or positions. Accordingly, we 
only focus on the number of external networks (EXNET), measuring the scale of 
networks outside the business sphere. Consistent with our hypotheses, we identified 
‘bridging actors’ who connect two or more corporate networks, as illustrated in Figure 
1. The powerful actor (429) depicted here connects the otherwise isolated network 
formed by the directors of Dassault Systèmes to other corporate networks in France. 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
There are various ways of measuring the relative strength of an individual’s 
position within a social network (Borgatti et al., 2009). Here we apply an eigenvector 
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centrality measure, which is commonly applied in the literature. Ties to other actors 
are assessed based on their weight in the network: a tie to an actor who is well 
connected counting more than a tie to an isolated actor; all ties being measured using 
eigenvector centrality. We also count the number of ties per actor then order our data 
in two dimensions: quantity of connections and quality of connections based on 
eigenvector centrality. In this way, the data contained in the relational matrix is 
reintegrated into our standard cross-sectional dataset with individuals as the unit of 
observation. This enables us to identify using multivariate models the factors 
determining the size and strength of corporate networks. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the whole sample. Membership is 
homogenous in predicable aspects: 95% are men and 94% are French. Since 2004, the 
presence of women director on leading French boards has increased (Moulin, 2013). 
However, the French business elite has not experienced the degree of 
internationalization one might expect. Preferencing those who have attended a grande 
école, are members of a grand corps and may have served in a Ministerial Cabinet 
militates against the recruitment of foreigners to top positions (Hartmann, 2011). 
Companies whose boards were especially internationalized boards included Dexia, 
60% of whose members were non-French, followed by Alstom (56%), Orange, Suez 
and Aventis (50%); reflecting their origins, involvement in mergers, and the 
correspondingly high percentage of company turnover achieved abroad (Korn/Ferry 
International, 2002; Harvey and Maclean, 2010). We found no evidence to suggest, 
however, that the French corporate elite had become more heterogeneous in ethnic 
origin, despite the significant presence in France of individuals of North-
African/French heritage, who form a class fraction of the working classes. In terms of 
social class, those originating from social classes one and two dominate the corporate 
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elite (63%). Just 21% of the elite are bridging actors connecting two or more 
corporate networks. These are the hyper-agents who dominate the field of power in 
France. The remaining 79% is composed of ‘ordinary’ members who presently do not 
bridge corporations, although they may have extra-corporate networks and might in 
the future emerge as bridging actors. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
In panel A of Table 2 we can see that bridging actors often come from the top two 
social classes; for example, 69% of bridging actors had the advantage of elite 
schooling compared to 52% of ordinary actors. There is an evident class divide. Just 
5% of all members of the elite emerged from the lowest social class, and the divide 
becomes yet more pronounced with respect to bridging actors. We might surmise that 
having an elite education and coming from a high-status background are positively 
related to access to corporate and non-profit organizations. This is confirmed in Panel 
B, which shows that a high proportion of individuals from the upper classes span 
three or more life-worlds. Panel C likewise confirms that extra-corporate networks are 
the domain of the top two social classes. 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
The statistics presented in Table 1 are suggestive rather than conclusive. Some 
variables are related, implying the co-existence of both direct and indirect causal 
effects. For example, social class might be causal with respect to elite education. For 
individuals from the top two classes an elite education is almost a given: 83% being 
educated at an elite school and 75% having an elite higher education, whereas just 
22% of individuals from the lower-middle class and 18% from lowest class attended 
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an elite school. Matters of causality, direct and indirect, are explored in the 
multivariate analysis that follows. 
The size of individual corporate networks varies widely from one to 77 direct 
ties. Measures of network strength (ST) based on average eigenvector centrality and 
maximum eigenvector centrality (MAX_ST) exhibit similar degrees of heterogeneity. 
As most individuals achieve an eigenvector centrality of zero, indicating weak 
networks, we use tobit models for the left-censored dependent variables ST and 
MAX_ST. Additionally, we report a logit model where the dependent variable 
STRONG assumes the value one if an individual has a strictly positive eigenvector 
centrality, or zero otherwise.  
Based on our hypotheses, we test whether (1) elite education, (2) extra-
corporate networks, and (3) social class, affect the size and strength of corporate 
networks. We include the following independent variables: GENDER (coded one for 
males and zero for females), AGE in years, and dummy variables for French 
nationality (NATION), being raised in the Paris region (PARIS), attending an elite 
school (ES), and attending an elite HE establishment (EHE). To test whether networks 
outside the business sphere are of causal significance, we include the number of 
external ties (EXNET). Bridging actors who connect two or more networks are 
identified using the dummy variable BRIDGE. Finally, we incorporate dummy 
variables for each social class, using the lowest (C_4) as reference category.  
In Table 3, column A references the dependent variable SIZE, columns B and 
C respectively report on tobit models used to explain MAX_ST and ST of individual 
networks, and column D references the logistic model with the dummy variable 
STRONG as the dependent variable. The findings reported in column A confirm that 
being a bridging actor enhances network size, and that enjoying an elite education 
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(ES, EHE) and having extra-corporate networks have a positive bearing on network 
size. From columns B and C, there is confirmation that being a bridging agent 
enhances network strength, but this is not the case for specification D. For models B 
and C, being raised in the Paris region strengthens corporate networks. However, the 
supposition that class has a positive bearing on network size is not supported. 
Together these findings confirm that bridging actors hold strong positions in corporate 
networks, that having an elite HE helps in forming large networks, and that having 
extra-corporate networks boosts the size of corporate networks. 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
The most surprising results are those relating to social class, which appears to 
have little bearing on the formation of corporate networks. This, however, would be a 
false conclusion because class does not bear directly on outcomes, but operates 
indirectly through its impact on educational opportunities and networking capabilities. 
In Table 4, we report the findings of five additional models that demonstrate the 
indirect effect of class on corporate networking. Column E references an OLS 
regression explaining the size of extra-corporate networks. This highlights the 
importance of age, confirming that elite corporate actors attract more invitations to 
join non-profit boards as their careers progress. It also confirms that individuals from 
the lower classes are disadvantaged relative to their upper- and upper-middle-class 
peers. In columns F and G, we model elite schooling and elite HE respectively using 
logistic regressions. These confirm the educational advantage conferred by being 
raised in and around Paris and the critical importance of social class in accessing elite 
educational institutions. Column H reports the results of a logistic regression with 
BRIDGE as the dependent variable. Here, the top social class does not have an 
indirect effect on outcomes; however, being in the upper-middle class has a positive 
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impact on becoming a bridging actor. Once we control for elite education (Model I), 
the impact of being in the upper-middle class disappears suggesting indirect effects 
working through elite education. Emergence as a bridging actor linking otherwise 
unrelated networks can be seen as a strategy adopted by corporate elites independent 
of their social background. Nonetheless, our findings confirm that social class has a 
powerful indirect effect on the formation of corporate networks by way of ties forged 
through attendance at elite HE institutions and appointment to non-profit boards. 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
Our findings confirm that having an elite higher education is directly 
beneficial to the formation of strong, extensive corporate networks. This is an 
unsurprising result consistent with Bourdieu’s (1993, 1996a) theoretical stance and 
prior empirical studies (Hartmann, 2000; Suleiman, 1978; Useem and Karabel, 1986). 
Our findings also confirm that building networks outside the corporate sphere is a 
source of networking advantage within it. Again, this is consistent with prior literature 
(Collins-Dogrul, 2012; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Scott, 1991).  
Our most important findings relate to the enduring importance of class in an 
ostensibly meritocratic society. We show how social class impacts significantly on 
access to an elite education and on the development of extra-corporate networks, both 
having a crucial bearing on corporate network formation. These findings are 
consistent with the work of Useem and Karabel (1986) on the US, but go further in 
implicating the relationship between class and extra-corporate networks in corporate 
network formation and the operation of the field of power. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
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In an interview with Loïc Wacquant (1993) published in this journal, Bourdieu 
elaborates his thinking on the relationship between different modes of reproduction in 
society. He points to the structural homology between the French grandes écoles and 
the field of power, ‘covering the whole set of dominant positions: the Episcopate, the 
university, employers, high civil service etc.’ (Wacquant, 1993: 20). The construct of 
the field of power is presented as ‘marking a break with all existing theories of the 
dominant’, which are flawed because they study ‘populations of agents’ rather than 
‘structures of power’ or the ‘space of positions’ occupied by agents in society (pp.20-
21). The proper object of analysis should be ‘the objective relations that obtain 
between these various sub-spaces and the mechanisms which … perpetuate the 
structures’ (p.21). The research presented here has been conducted in this spirit, 
seeking to test and refine Bourdieu’s original ideas while extending and building upon 
them, empirically and theoretically. 
First, we contribute to research which conceptualizes processes of hierarchy 
and internal differentiation within elite groups (Flemmen, 2012). Critical here is the 
distinction we draw between a majority of corporate leaders whose careers focus on 
the business domain and a powerful minority who assume a society-wide role, 
transcending the business field (Denord et al., 2011; Reed, 2012), demonstrating the 
on-going significance of the social class effect in the selection of hyper-agents. One of 
Bourdieu’s most compelling insights is to demonstrate in a subtle, non-deterministic 
fashion how existing elites use a highly stratified education system as a mode of 
reproduction that confers upon their offspring dual legitimacy of ‘the aristocratism of 
birth and the meritocratism of academic success’ (Wacquant, 1993: 21). Education as 
an inter-generational mode of transmission of power exposes the upper classes to risk: 
success cannot be guaranteed as entrants from all social classes compete for academic 
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distinction. However, for those who do make it, the prize is that of meritocratic 
legitimacy deriving from the symbolic power of elite academic honours. The upper-
middle classes (C_2) often do best in this regard, dominating the grandes écoles by 
combining birth and meritocracy to optimal effect. Our research provides tangible 
support for the continuing relevance of Bourdieu’s ideas. While the correlation 
between social class and education is well known in the social sciences, being closely 
related to habitus, we demonstrate how this works practically in enhancing the 
chances of accession to the field of power. Education is shown directly to influence 
the capacity of business leaders to establish the corporate networks that are 
fundamental to hyper-agency and accession to the field of power. Educational 
socialization alone, conversely, is unlikely to culminate in hyper-agency without the 
additional impetus of social class. While compensatory for lower-class aspirants, the 
cultural capital acquired through education fails to compensate wholly, requiring a 
shared class-based habitus to operate to best effect (Hartmann, 2000). As Bourdieu 
(1990: 68) emphasizes, ‘one cannot enter this magic circle by an instantaneous 
decision of the will, but only by birth’. This challenges the notion that business elites 
have become more meritocratic, in that they are more ‘self-made’. Hence, we add to 
earlier evidence that corporate wealth is not generally given to self-made men who 
have deferred gratifications and are endowed only by native talent; on the contrary, 
they have a high probability of having privileged education and origins within the 
upper or upper-middle classes. Our contribution to Bourdieusian scholarship lies most 
importantly in our analysis of hyper-agents – those actors who ‘make things happen’ 
within corporate elites and wider parts of the field of power, or alternatively offer 
resistance to change – which reveals the debts these dominants owe to elite schools 
and privileged classes.  
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Second, our research develops Bourdieu’s analysis of social class effects 
(Bennett et al., 2009; Flemmen, 2012; Savage et al., 2005; 2015) by specifying a 
second mode of elite reproduction. In our models, the capacity of elite actors to 
establish extra-corporate networks by securing appointments to prestigious non-profit 
boards emerges as directly related to the establishment of corporate networks. By 
extending their social and organizational reach, agents increase the size and scope of 
their social networks and potential to operate effectively within the field of power, 
making them more attractive candidates for appointment to corporate boards (Zajac 
and Westphal, 1996). In this, bridging actors may supply the social glue which was 
previously provided by interlocking shareholdings, such that the French corporate 
economy retains its close cohesive character despite financialization and the advent of 
the euro (Morin, 2000). Again, as with access to elite education, social class operates 
indirectly to determine who wins and who loses in the networking game. Reference-
group dynamics are instrumental here (Bottero, 2004). Such agents benefit from the 
comforting shared resemblance or in-group bias which makes them attractive to their 
peers, fostering mutual recognition (Ekman, 2013). For Bourdieu (1996a: 317), this is 
the guiding principle of upper-class groups, since such agents ‘recognize themselves 
as members of the class, and in doing so, confer upon it the only form of existence a 
group can possess’ (Bourdieu, 1987: 10). 
In other words, high-status agents select one another, and are selected in turn, 
engendering in so doing a corporate class in its own right, such that higher social class 
is tacitly preferred if not directly required (Bourdieu, 1985, 1993). Mills (1956: 138-
9) concurs, arguing that ‘in close-ups of the executive career, we observe how men in 
the same circles choose one another’. For Mills (1956: 141), accessing and engaging 
in the field of power is not a matter of ability, but one of replication through 
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‘conformity with the criteria of those who have already succeeded’. The playing-
fields are not level or neutral but favour bridging actors distinguished by their higher-
status backgrounds and elite education, combining birth with meritocracy, who 
comprise the afore-mentioned ‘fraternity of the successful’. In selecting fellow board 
members, agents recruit colleagues in their mirror image, whose conduct speaks of 
value similarity, with whom they can form lasting relationships (Stern and Westphal, 
2010; Westphal and Zajac, 1995).  
Third, building on Bourdieu’s original conceptualization, our research 
highlights aspects of the nature and modus operandi of the field of power that hitherto 
have received scant attention in the literature. These relate to purpose, membership, 
habitus, networks and coalitions. As an integrative social domain at the pinnacle of 
society, the main purpose of the field of power is to reconstitute the institutional order 
in response to societal pressures driven upward through field hierarchies and wider 
social movements (Maclean and Harvey, 2016; Useem, 1984). This process of 
institutional adaptation is viewed by North (1990) as fundamental to economic and 
social change, or to the preservation of the status quo. Membership of the power elite 
responsible for managing or resisting institutional change is, as we have seen, 
exclusive and dominated by those originating from the upper and upper-middle 
classes. For lower-class aspirants, class operates in a restrictive manner, curtailing 
ascent such that they often achieve ‘next best’ positions, failing to become hyper-
agents in their own right (Bourdieu, 1996a; Hartmann, 2000), excluded from 
‘“forbidden” spaces of power’ (Courpasson, Dany and Clegg, 2012: 811). 
The field of power, of course, remains inaccessible to the great majority of 
people (Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot, 2007). This is another reason why examining the 
determinants of access matters. It serves as a ‘structuring structure’ in its own right, 
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through which members learn how to behave by absorption in a field of power-
specific habitus (Bourdieu, 1990: 53). Hyper-agents occupy a practical world of 
boards, networks, committees, colloquia and other meeting-places (e.g. the exclusive 
Club du Siècle, the epitome of privilege) that serve as normative instruments for the 
power elite of corporate capitalism (Giddens, 1984). The common objectified 
properties shared by top directors in the corporate field create a corporate-based social 
class, producing what Le Wita (1994: 18) calls an ‘[haute] bourgeoisie of work’. This 
class is organically unified by virtue of an ‘incomparable plurality of principles of 
domination (power or type of capital), which limits competition between power 
holders and promotes partial and multiple alliances amongst them’ (Bourdieu, 2011: 
137), encompassing potentially adversarial interests within a shared worldview, such 
that elites – corporate, political, administrative and technocratic – are often remote 
from the rest of the populace. At a time when relations between the state and its 
citizens are purportedly being renegotiated (Jessop, 2007), when the success of the 
European project (recently called into question by the British Brexit vote of June 
2016) has ceded numerous powers from Paris to Brussels (Genieys, 2005), elite 
preservation remains the order of the day. 
The networks through which corporate members accomplish institutional 
change are extensive, spanning numerous life-worlds; prominent politicians, 
government officials, journalists, intellectuals, financiers and other ‘structural 
equivalents’ are subject to the convening power of those controlling massive 
economic capital (Lindsay, 2008). Networks are not hard-wired but reconfigure (and 
unravel) in pursuit of specific campaigns (Ahuja, 2000; Ahuja et al., 2012; Das and 
Teng, 2002). In this way coalitions of hyper-agents emanating from different fields 
are assembled, perhaps temporarily, united by a common goal. One coalition may be 
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defeated by another in competitive contests to reframe ideas, policies, regulations and 
laws. At stake are outcomes of far-reaching significance for society-at-large (Zald and 
Lounsbury, 2010). 
 Is the field of power as depicted above distinctive to the French context by 
reason of specific historical trends and elite formations that have existed for some 
time? The long-standing ‘exceptional’ nature of the French business system (Genieys, 
2005), characterized by the strength of the grandes écoles and their continuing 
centrality in business, finance, politics and public administration, might lead one to 
think so (Dudouet and Joly, 2010; Eymeri, 2001). There is also something of a ‘Paris 
effect’, given the extreme centralization of the French system – home to the best 
educational institutions, the key organs of government, the headquarters of most 
leading French companies, and the haute bourgeoisie in the stylish 16
th
 
arrondissement. Bourdieu’s findings are not universal but historically (and culturally) 
variable. This suggests that the field of power might actually best be conceived not as 
a single, abstract entity as it is commonly presented (Bourdieu, 1993: 1996a; 2011), 
but rather as plural, variegated fields of power couched within different regimes and 
jurisdictions. This has implications for studying elites in other European countries, 
best situated within their particular socio-political and cultural habitus (Hartmann, 
2000).  
We have shown, in the case of France, that hyper-agency and inclusion within 
the power elite remains predominantly a matter of class. We shed light on the 
enduring advantage of higher-status backgrounds at a time when high income and 
wealth are attracting increasing attention (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007; Piketty, 
2014). We challenge researchers to reconsider class, which has been largely forgotten. 
Our findings run counter to current fashions concerning elites and power by 
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demonstrating that the hyper-agent elite has a higher preponderance of higher class 
measures than the ‘ordinary’ business elite, in terms of education and other class 
factors. This is a challenge to recent literature which often suggests that conventional 
class measures have become less significant (Giddens, 1991; Savage, 2000) and that 
business elites have become more meritocratic, being ‘self-made’ (Khan, 2011). It 
may well be the case, as Bennett et al. (2009: 1) observe, that ‘the vocabularies of 
class have lost much of their purchase in both public and political life’, but this does 
not mean that class has ceased materially to influence career trajectories and 
allocative outcomes. Our findings show that socially reproductive forces remain 
powerful in deciding who rules in the ‘magic circle’ at the highest level in society. In 
the present state of inequalities, resistance to change from incumbents who benefit 
from existing arrangements can be powerful (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007). 
Although as we have argued, this should not be taken to imply that social 
conservatism necessarily prevails. As Hall (1984: 283) insists, the political 
dimensions of economic management are not set in tablets of stone and from time to 
time may be recast; as the advent of the euro, the growing significance of Europe and 
the spread of financialization in France have demonstrated. The field of power by its 
very nature is an arena of competition, potentially enabling differing agendas to be 
reconciled and institutional change to occur (or not) in response to both bottom-up 
and top-down pressures. How the field of power operates specifically and practically 
in different cultures, circumstances and jurisdictions, and how the presence of 
bridging agents influences business decisions within it, are matters for future research. 
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Figure 1: Bridging actor 429 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
   Variable Obs Mean Std Min Max 
SIZE 1068 10.55 7.36 1.00 77.00 
ST 1068 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.63 
MAX_ST 1068 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.23 
STRONG 1082 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
BRIDGE 1082 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
GENDER 1082 0.95 0.21 0.00 1.00 
AGE 1082 55.39 9.66 20.00 92.00 
NATION 1081 0.94 0.25 0.00 1.00 
PARIS 1082 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
ES 923 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 
EHE 1048 0.78 0.41 0.00 1.00 
EXNET 1082 1.47 1.19 0.00 5.00 
C_1 1082 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
C_2 1082 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 
C_3 1082 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 
C_4 1082 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
      Note: Obs = number of observations. Std = standard deviation. Min = minimum 
value. Max = maximum value. The dependent variables refer to the number of 
connections (SIZE), average eigenvector centrality (ST), maximum eigenvector 
centrality (MAX_ST) and the dummy STRONG, which takes the value one for a 
strictly positive eigenvector centrality or zero otherwise. The dummy BRIDGE for 
bridging actors is treated as an independent and dependent variable to explore direct 
and indirect effects of social class. The independent variables are for gender, age, 
nationality, place of upbringing, elite education (ES, EHE), the number of extra-
corporate networks (EXNET) and social class (C_1, C_2, C_3, C_4). 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
    Panel A: Bridging agents (1) versus non-bridging agent (0) 
  AGE ES EHE C_1 C_2 C_3 C_4 
0 55.17 0.52 0.75 0.20 0.40 0.34 0.06 
1 56.19 0.69 0.89 0.21 0.52 0.24 0.03 
ALL 55.39 0.56 0.78 0.20 0.43 0.32 0.05 
Panel B: Number of life-worlds spanned (1, 2, 3 or 4) 
  AGE ES EHE C_1 C_2 C_3 C_4 
1 54.70 0.30 0.61 0.10 0.28 0.54 0.08 
2 54.29 0.47 0.72 0.01 0.39 0.50 0.10 
3 55.64 0.64 0.82 0.28 0.47 0.21 0.03 
4 56.28 0.72 0.90 0.32 0.51 0.14 0.03 
ALL 55.39 0.56 0.78 0.20 0.43 0.32 0.05 
Panel C: Extra-corporate networks (0, 1, 2 or 3) 
  AGE ES EHE C_1 C_2 C_3 C_4 
0 54.59 0.36 0.62 0.08 0.31 0.54 0.08 
1 53.35 0.49 0.76 0.08 0.42 0.41 0.08 
2 55.39 0.71 0.87 0.35 0.50 0.14 0.02 
3 58.80 0.71 0.90 0.29 0.50 0.18 0.03 
ALL 55.39 0.56 0.78 0.20 0.43 0.32 0.05 
 
       Note: The sample is divided by actor status (Panel A), life-worlds spanned (Panel B) 
and number of extra-corporate networks (Panel C). Each panel provides a cross-
tabulation by age, elite education, and social class. 
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Table 3: Direct effect of class, education and external networks 
  A B C D 
  BRIDGE 0.922*** 0.206** 0.054** 0.412 
  GENDER 0.013 0.314 0.088 - 
  AGE -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.008 
  NATION -0.015 -0.214 -0.057 -0.002 
  PARIS 0.024 0.164* 0.041* 0.556 
  ES 0.094** - - 0.449 
  EHE 0.114** 0.148 0.035 0.225 
  EXNET 0.046*** 0.054 0.015 0.180 
  C_1 -0.131 -0.067 -0.012 0.134 
  C_2 -0.077 -0.084 -0.019 -0.110 
  C_3 -0.003 -0.028 -0.003 0.249 
  Constant 2.572*** -1.064** -0.292** -3.207* 
  N 913 1034 1034 890 
  aic 910.594 458.809 272.73 493.156 
  bic 968.395 518.103 332.024 545.86 
  R-squared 0.535 0.059 0.100 0.039 
  
Note: Model A explains the size of networks (SIZE) using an OLS regression. As 
SIZE is not normally distributed, we use a log transformation for the dependent 
variable. Models B and C refer to tobit models explaining the average (ST) and 
maximum eigenvector centrality (MAX_ST) respectively. In models B and C, the 
explanatory variable ES needs to be dropped to avoid non-convergence due to 
restricting the number of observations. Model D uses a logistic regression to explain 
the dummy STRONG. The dummy GENDER drops from Model D due to perfect 
predictability. All models are estimated using robust standard errors to account for 
heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 4: Indirect effect of social class 
     E F G H I 
 GENDER 0.342* 1.802*** 0.486 0.090 -0.174 
 AGE 0.018*** -0.002 0.000 0.013 0.019* 
 NATION -0.802*** -0.685 -0.450 0.091 0.070 
 PARIS -0.005 0.930*** 1.450*** 0.417** 0.246 
 C_1 1.076*** 3.163*** 1.949*** 0.875 0.738 
 C_2 0.746*** 2.557*** 2.347*** 1.035* 0.632 
 C_3 0.020 0.249 0.458 0.469 0.458 
 ES  - - - - 0.333 
 EHE - - - - 0.584* 
 Constant 0.354 -2.760** -0.363 -3.162*** -3.514*** 
N 1081 923 1047 1081 922 
 aic 3221.01 953.277 910.909 1105.86 983.928 
 bic 3260.9 991.898 950.538 1145.74 1032.19 
 R-squared 0.190 0.260 0.183 0.024 0.035 
  
Note: Model E uses an OLS regression to explain the number of extra-corporate 
networks. Models F, G and H apply logistic regressions with the binary variables elite 
schooling (ES), elite higher education (EHE) and bridging actor (BRIDGE) as 
dependent variables. Model I extends Model H by incorporating the impact of elite 
education. All models are estimated using robust standard errors to account for 
heteroskedasticity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
